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Abstract: 
The Leapfrog (LF) initiative, directed at improving patient safety in hospitals, may be the most ambitious, 
coordinated attempt to date on the part of large employers to shape the delivery of health care in America. This 
article assesses the role of market conditions and other factors in influencing hospital responses to LF activities 
at the community level. Community characteristics were found to be important in explaining hospital 
participation in a LF safety standards survey at the study sites. However, characteristics of the individual 
hospitals, and of the LF goals themselves, were more important in explaining the relatively limited progress by 
hospitals across all sites in achieving those goals over a 5-year period. 
Keywords: The Leapfrog Group; patient safety; hospitals; health care coalitions; quality improvement; health 
reform; hospital competition 
 
Article: 
n response to an Institute of Medicine report on building a safer health system (Committee on Quality of 
Health Care, 2000), several large employers formed the Leapfrog Group (LF) in November 2000. The objective 
of the group was to improve the quality and safety of medical care. LF identified three potential ―leaps‖ forward 
in the area of patient safety that were directed specifically at hospitals: ―computer physician order entry‖ 
(CPOE) for medications in hospitals, the use of intensivists in hospital intensive care units, and referring 
patients to hospitals that meet volume (or outcomes where available) thresholds and process standards (The 
Leapfrog Group, 2007). They chose these particular leaps because they believed they were supported by 
research, their adoption could make a measurable improvement in safety, and because the leaps had intuitive 
appeal to the general public. 
 
The leaps were controversial, sparking a lively debate at the national level concerning whether they represented 
the best allocation of scarce hospital resources to achieve substantial and immediate gains in patient safety. 
Although the quality of the research base for the leaps and their feasibility were questioned by the American 
Hospital Association (AHA) and other hospital groups (Lovern, 2001), LF quickly attracted many large 
employers and employer coalitions to its cause. By late 2001, it had 84 participating purchaser members 
(―frogs‖) representing 26 million covered lives and expenditures of $45 billion annually on medical care 
(Sandrick, 2001). 
 
Spurred by its growing membership and an increasingly complex set of activities, LF established various 
committees (―lily pads‖) to carry out tasks, one of which was the implementation of LF’s ―regional strategy.‖ It 
initiated its Regional Rollout (RRO) effort in March 2001, with the identification of seven communities or 
regions in which individual purchasers or purchaser coalitions agreed to lead coordinated efforts around the 
three leaps (Seattle/Tacoma, California, Minnesota, St. Louis, Eastern Tennessee, Atlanta, and Michigan.). In 
March 2002, 12 additional RRO sites were selected. Subsequently, the designation of RRO sites proceeded at a 
slower pace, but by March 2006, there were 31 RRO markets containing approximately 57% of all urban 
hospitals in the United States (The Leapfrog Group, 2006). 
 
 
 
I 
New Contribution 
It is not an exaggeration to say that LF is the most ambitious coordinated attempt, to date, on the part of large 
employers to reshape health care in America. Given the scope and visibility of LF, as well as the significance of 
the problems it sought to address, it is important to understand the factors that have influenced hospital 
responses to LF efforts at the community level. We examine the role of market conditions and other factors in 
influencing the willingness of hospitals to support LF’s efforts and report their status with respect to three LF 
goals, as well as the progress of hospitals over time in achieving these goals. 
 
Leapfrog Regional Rollout Logic Model 
Based on a review of early LF documents, materials used to recruit purchasers to be RRO leaders, and 
interviews we conducted with LF leaders at the national level, we constructed a ―logic model‖ that incorporates 
the assumptions, activities, and expected short-term, intermediate, and long-term outcomes underlying the 
Leapfrog Regional Rollout (LF RRO) strategy (see Figure 1). As the figure illustrates, a key function 
envisioned for LF’s national office was to provide information and technical assistance to local employers, who 
would use their community influence and purchasing power to engage hospitals, health plans, and other 
employers in efforts to improve safety. Specifically, local RRO leaders were expected to encourage hospitals to 
support the LF RRO by completing periodic surveys in which they ―self-reported‖ their status with respect to 
achieving the LF leaps. Employers and health plans then would communicate the survey results to employees 
and the general public. The assumption was that consumers would use this evidence on patient safety when 
choosing a hospital, thereby creating pressure on hospitals to improve their performance on the leaps. 
Employers and their health plans were expected to support this process by implementing health benefit designs 
that provided financial incentives and rewards for employees to use leap-compliant hospitals. As more hospitals 
met LF standards, in an attempt to attract and retain patients, LF expected that the number of medical errors in 
local health care systems would decline, patient outcomes would improve, and cost savings would be realized. 
 
Factors Expected to Influence Hospital Responses 
While the LF logic model clearly anticipated that responses to LF rollout efforts would vary across 
communities and hospitals, it did not explicitly identify the potential determinants of that variation. However, 
the substantial literature on health care reform efforts at the community level suggests several community 
characteristics that are likely to play an important role in the success of RRO efforts (Anderson, Herold, Buler, 
Kohrman, &Morrison, 1985; Bazzoli, Stein, Alexander, & Conrad, 1997; Bogue, Anita, Harmata, & Hall, 1997; 
Bolland & Wilson, 1994; Borland, Smith, & Nankivil, 1994; Brown et al., 1990; Christianson, Dowd, 
Kralewski, Hayes, & Wisner, 1995; Christianson & Feldman, 2005; Dowd, Coulam, & Feldman, 2000; 
Emanuel & Titlow, 2002; Gitterman, Weiner, Domino, McKethan, & Enthoven, 2003; McLaughlin, 1995; 
Miller, 1994; Shortell et al., 2002; Weiner & Alexander, 1998; Wholey & Burns, 2003; Wholey, Christianson, 
Draper, Lesser, & Burns, 2004; Wickizer et al., 1998). Several accounts in this literature focused on provider 
participation in, or resistance to, efforts to change local health care systems (see Brown et al., 1990; 
Christianson & Feldman, 2005; Christianson, Feldman, Weiner, & Drury, 1999). Typically these studies 
analyzed attempts on the part of employers or health plans to negotiate with providers over network design and 
participation, elicited support for community quality improvement efforts, or influenced plans for mergers and 
consolidations (Christianson, 1998; Christianson & Trude, 2003; Devers, Brewster, & Casalino, 2003; Lee, 
Alexander, & Bazzoli, 2003; Lipson & DeSa, 1996). 
 
Because a key objective of the LF RRO effort was to engage hospitals in the public reporting of progress on 
patient safety goals, the literature on public performance reporting in the health care sector is also germane to 
our study. While there are few analyses of the decisions of health care organizations and providers to vol-
untarily report performance data, most of the published literature has addressed the decisions of health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) to report the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) and 
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPs) performance measures to the National 
Committee for Quality Assurance (McCormick, Himmelstein, Woolhander, Wolfe, & Bor, 2002; Scanlon et al., 
2006). 
 
In addition, there is a sizeable and growing literature on the use of ―report card‖ or ―performance‖ information 
by consumers to make decisions (see Abraham, Feldman, & Carlin, 2005; Chernew, Gowrisankaran, & 
Scanlon, 2001; Chernew & Scanlon, 1998; Feldman, Christianson, & Schultz, 2000; Hibbard, Stockard, & 
Tusler, 2005; Schultz, Call, Feldman, & Christianson, 2001; Scanlon, Chernew, McLaughlin, & Solon, 2002). 
However, this literature is less relevant to the current study except for the possibility that hospitals may view 
public demands for patient safety information as a reason to report data to LF. 
 
Based on our review of the literature, we expected hospital responses to RRO efforts in their communities to be 
influenced by factors that can be grouped into three broad categories: community-level factors, factors related 
to individual hospitals, and the characteristics of the leaps themselves. 
 
Community-Level Factors 
We hypothesized that three community characteristics will have the greatest impact on the success of RRO 
efforts: breadth and depth of employer involvement, hospital market structure, and historical relations among 
employers and community health care providers. 
 
Breadth and depth of employer involvement 
Employer involvement in and commitment to the LF RRO in their communities is likely to be an important 
influence on hospital responses, as is the number of community residents receiving health benefits through 
those committed employers. Hospitals are likely to be more responsive if they believe there is broad-based, 
organized employer support, or if one or more high-profile employers (with a large number of employees in the 
community) are actively and publicly supportive of LF. These employers could affect the distribution of 
admissions among hospitals by communicating information about hospital performance on LF leaps or by 
restructuring their health benefit designs, including using reimbursement to reward hospitals that meet LF 
standards. If this were the case, hospitals would be more likely to view support of RRO activities as necessary 
to maintain or grow market share. They would be more likely to collaborate in LF implementation, report their 
progress through the LF hospital survey, and devote resources to meeting LF standards. 
 
Hospital market structure 
The degree of consolidation of local hospital markets is likely to affect hospital responses, along with the 
presence of community hospital associations or councils. Hospitals in communities where there is substantial 
consolidation or high occupancy rates may be less likely to respond to LF demands, perceiving their long-run 
market positions to be relatively secure. They would be less concerned about any advantage that competitors 
might secure through cooperation with LF. Also, hospitals may be more likely to resist LF efforts in 
communities with existing organizational structures involving all local hospitals, such as a local hospital 
association. The existence of these structures decreases the costs of organizing a collective hospital response to 
the LF RRO and makes it easier to enforce such a response. 
 
Historical relations. It is likely that RRO communities will vary in their history of employer–hospital relations. 
These relations might involve employer joint-purchasing negotiations with hospitals, collaboration over the 
collection and reporting of performance data, or even prior initiatives around reduction in medical errors in 
hospitals. In any case, the LF RRO effort would ―enter the picture‖ at different points in the evolution of these 
relations. Hospitals might be less inclined to support the RRO if they had successfully resisted or defused 
employer-led change initiatives in the past. They would be more likely to collaborate with employers in 
implementing the LF leaps if they had engaged in prior collaborative efforts around quality improvement or 
patient safety that they perceived to be constructive and valuable. The existence of ongoing collaborative 
structures also would reduce the costs to both hospitals and employers of organizing around the RRO. 
 
Hospital and Leap Characteristics 
In addition to community-level factors, individual hospital characteristics, in conjunction with the distinct 
demands associated with the individual leaps, could lead to variation in hospital support of LF and progress 
toward leap adoption. The volume-related standards advocated by LF initially generated the most concern 
among hospitals; the standards were criticized as having a weak basis in research and as leaving hospitals with 
very limited options (Conn, 2007; Florida Hospital Association, 2007; Peterson, Coombs, DeLong, Haan, & 
Ferguson, 2004). (Studies relating to this leap include Birkmeyer, 2000; Dudley, Johansen, Brand, Rennie, & 
Milstein, 2000; Luft, Bunker, & Enthoven, 1979; Luft, 1980; Luft et al., 1986; Maerki, Luft, & Hunt, 1986.) 
Also, compliance with the evidence-based hospital referral standards could have significant long-run 
implications for a hospital’s service-line competition with other community hospitals and for its relations with 
medical staff. Smaller, independent, community-based hospitals may not offer a service targeted by the leaps, 
or may be less likely to meet the volume standards when offering the service. In contrast, hospital systems 
might be able to consolidate service lines so that some system hospitals met volume standards. 
 
The intensivist leap generated much less concern; the hospital ―business case‖ for this leap seemed stronger, as 
did the case for potential improvements in quality of care (see Pollack, Katz, Ruttimann, & Getson, 1988; 
Pronovost, Young, Dorman, Robinson, & Angus, 1999; Pronovost et al., 2002). One major concern, however, 
was that a shortage of trained intensivists could drive up the cost to a hospital of meeting this leap, at least in 
the short run. In addition, implementing intensivist staffing often required negotiations with existing medical 
staff who were used to caring for, and billing for, their own patients in the ICU. 
 
The computer physician order entry (CPOE) leap was very controversial, primarily because of the high costs to 
an individual hospital of acquiring this technology and reported difficulties in installing CPOE, including 
―pushback‖ by hospital medical staff (Conn, 2007; Gater, 2005). Hospitals argued that there were less 
expensive, and potentially more effective, means of improving the safety of medication ordering, such as bar 
coding for example. But LF maintained its promotion of CPOE because it necessitated that hospitals move 
toward implementing clinical information systems and because clinical decision support at the time orders are 
made can both reduce mistakes and improve evidence-based care. Hospitals also suggested that taking full 
advantage of CPOE required integrating it with an electronic medical records system, including integration with 
laboratory data, diagnostic imaging, access to records by physicians from outside the hospital, and so forth. For 
the many hospitals lacking such a system, achieving a successful CPOE installation would require a major 
strategic investment and a significant amount of time. This suggests that larger hospitals, and hospitals that are 
part of systems, might be in a better position to meet the CPOE leap because of their greater ability to access 
needed funds and leverage economies of scale when purchasing. (Studies related to CPOE and early experience 
with its implementation include Bates et al., 1998; Bates et al., 1999; Cutler, Feldman, & Horwitz, 2005; 
Koppel et al., 2005; Kuperman & Gibson, 2003; Poon et al., 2004; Teich et al., 2000.) Finally, even though LF 
standards initially were meant to apply only to urban hospitals, rural hospitals expressed concerns that this LF 
policy risked unintentionally signaling that the quality of care in rural facilities was inferior because rural 
hospitals were less likely to have implemented the recommended practices. 
 
Method 
We employed a multisite case study design to address our research questions, using data from existing 
secondary data sources and conducting key informant interviews at each site. In this section, we describe the 
site and respondent selection, development of the key informant interview protocols, process for data collection 
and analysis, and limitations associated with the multi-site case study. 
 
Site Selection 
We selected seven RRO sites for our analysis: three sites (Atlanta, St. Louis, and Seattle) from the first wave 
(2001) of RRO communities and four (Dallas/Ft. Worth [DFW], TX; Rochester, NY; Savannah, GA; and 
Madison, WI [later expanded to include most of the state]) from the second wave (2002). We sought study sites 
that were diverse with respect to region, type of employer leadership (individual employer versus coalition), 
and size. We split our sample between wave one and wave two sites to allow for the possibility that hospital 
responses in the ―groundbreaking‖ initial wave of sites could differ from responses in subsequent RRO sites. 
For example, it is possible that hospitals would be more hesitant to participate in the first round of a new 
national initiative than in the second round. Choosing sites from the first two waves also allowed us to observe 
hospital survey completion and progress toward achieving LF goals for the longest period possible. Table 1 lists 
the RRO sites, RRO waves, and source of leadership for the seven RROs. 
 
 
Key Informant Interviews 
Our primary data source consisted of on-site interviews with 90 key stakeholders in the study communities 
from August 2003 to February 2004. The 1-hr interviews were conducted by two investigators at each site. We 
chose this approach because few details about how LF evolved at the local level were known, and we believed 
that the perspective of a diverse set of stakeholders within a given site was needed to understand how hospitals 
had responded to the RRO and the factors that influenced hospital responses. Respondents included hospital 
administrators (e.g., hospitals’ chief medical officers or medical directors, and hospitals’ quality assurance 
coordinators), participating employers, local RRO staff, representatives from local and national insurance 
carriers, and representatives from other relevant community organizations or industry groups such as hospital 
associations, or state-level hospital reporting initiatives. 
 
Common, structured protocols were used to guide the interviews, with separate protocols used for respondents 
in different positions. The protocols were designed to collect information regarding the nature of each site’s 
RRO effort, the responses of hospitals to that effort, and community and hospital characteristics influencing 
hospital responses. Initial versions of each protocol were reviewed by two individuals from the relevant 
stakeholder groups (e.g., hospital administrators), and revisions were made according to the feedback received. 
We targeted interview respondents by reviewing information regarding the dynamics of the local health care 
market, as well as the evolution of the RRO initiative in each market. Respondents included both supporters 
and skeptics of the LF RRO effort. 
 
All respondents were assured that their responses would be treated confidentially. We took handwritten notes 
and also tape recorded each interview, using both to produce summaries of the interviews. Finally, from May to 
August 2006, we again interviewed, in person or by telephone, the RRO leaders at the seven sites. We used 
these interviews to update information on RRO efforts and hospital responses in the communities and to 
provide a longitudinal perspective on RRO activities. (One site no longer had an RRO leader, so we conducted 
a repeat interview with a state hospital association representative.) To track ongoing developments at the study 
sites, we regularly participated in monthly conference calls and attended in-person meetings with LF rollout 
leaders over a 3-year period (through summer 2006). 
 
In addition to the qualitative data regarding hospital support for the RROs drawn from the interviews, we 
tracked participation over time in LF’s survey as a quantitative indicator of initial support for LF. The survey 
also provided data on actual leap implementation by hospitals–the intermediate goals portion of the logic 
model. (In the Appendix, we describe how hospitals reported implementation on the survey.) 
 
Analytic Approach and Limitations 
In assessing hospital responses to LF in the seven study communities, we followed standard approaches to 
qualitative data analysis (see Britan, 1978; Firestone & Herriott, 1983; Gillham, 2000; Glaser & Strauss, 1965; 
Greene & David, 1984; Ragin, 1999; Weiss & Rein, 1970; Yin, 1993). We reviewed documents provided by 
the LF national office and LF’s director of the RRO effort, media reports, and results from LF hospital surveys. 
Based on these documents and our initial data collection efforts, we constructed brief case studies of each site 
(available by request from the lead author), which were reviewed for accuracy, though not endorsement, by a 
subset of respondents and by LF staff at the national level. 
 
Two of the authors independently analyzed the interview data collected at each site. Within a site, we compared 
responses to the same topic from different types of interview respondents in order to identify areas where 
perceptions differed and areas of consensus. Factors were identified within each site that appeared to influence 
hospital responses to the RRO effort, and these findings were compared to expectations, based on prior 
research, as described above. 
 
There are limitations to the conclusions we can draw from our study approach. First, as in all multisite case 
study designs in which the ―participant‖ cases are to some extent volunteers, the experiences in the sites in our 
sample may generalize neither to all RRO communities nor certainly to communities that were not designated 
RRO sites. This is a particular concern because the employer-leaders in the first two rounds of the RRO effort 
could be regarded as ―early adopters‖ who were especially supportive of LF and its goals and believed that 
there were features of their communities that would facilitate a successful RRO. In contrast, employers who led 
later RRO efforts, or chose not to participate, may have felt that there were substantial barriers to success in 
their communities. Second, responses of hospitals to the LF RRO efforts are likely to be shaped by 
environmental changes not related to LF. In an attempt to identify when this may have occurred, we used the 
frequent tracking of secondary data and statistics, as well as the follow-up interviews. Third, the changes sought 
by LF may take much longer than 4 to 5 years to accomplish, so the findings of this study should be interpreted 
as early responses on the part of the hospitals in the study communities. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that 
the direction charted during the first 5 years is highly relevant in projecting outcomes beyond that period. 
 
Results: Survey Participation and Factors Influencing Hospital Support for LF Efforts at the 
Community Level 
Hospital Survey Participation 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the initial measure of LF success is the degree to which hospitals that are located in 
RRO areas respond to the LF safety survey as requested. The response rates for each of the five reporting 
periods (beginning in June 2001) for the LF hospital survey are displayed in Table 2 for each of the study sites, 
along with the average response rate for all of the RRO sites (excluding study sites) operational at the time of 
each survey. With the exception of the St. Louis RRO, the study sites have generally had higher rates of survey 
participation than the average non-study site. Two general observations can be made concerning response rates 
at the study sites. First, the study sites seemed to fall into three groups based on their response rates in the initial 
reporting period: three sites that began with 100% hospital response (i.e., high response rate sites), three sites 
that had response rates of 64 to 83% (i.e., intermediate response rate sites), and one site with a very low initial 
response rate. Second, there was little or no improvement in hospital participation in the LF survey over time. 
In fact, in five of the seven study sites the percentage of hospitals responding to the LF survey declined from 
period one to period five. In some sites, this appears to be a consequence of an increase in the number of hospi-
tals targeted by RROs for survey completion over the five reporting periods, with newly targeted hospitals 
declining to participate. The decline may also be caused by the addition of a fourth leap by LF in 2004, the safe 
practices leap, which increased the hospital survey length and the public exposure of hospital practices. 
 
High Initial Response Rate Sites 
While three sites had 100% response rates for the first round of the LF survey, in the Seattle and Savannah sites 
the high survey response rates were not associated with hospital collaboration in RRO planning and other 
activities. In Rochester, however, there was evidence of hospital support for the RRO effort, and there are 
several factors that explain early hospital support for LF in Rochester. 
 
 
First, actors in Rochester’s health care system have participated collaboratively in planning and reform 
activities for three decades, and there was an organization in place (Rochester Health Care Forum) with a 
committee structure that facilitated discussion of the LF RRO effort. Initially, employers did not feel that this 
organization was devoting the appropriate attention to LF, but changes were made to address their concern. 
Second, the administrative direction for LF in Rochester was provided by a health plan representative who was 
trusted by employers and providers. Because of its dominant market position, the plan, in effect, consolidated 
purchasing power in the community, functioning as an employer coalition might in representing employer 
interests in other communities. And, because of the substantial market share held by the plan, if it were to make 
changes in its benefit design to support LF, this would have a major impact on all community providers. 
 
Third, hospitals in the community had made progress on the CPOE and intensivist leaps prior to designation of 
Rochester as an RRO site. The survey provided an opportunity to bring this progress to the attention of the 
community as a whole. The combination of these three factors led to a 100% response rate for the first two 
periods and a 75% response rate for the third period. By the fourth period, however, the organization that 
managed the RRO effort had dissolved, no local employers had assumed leadership responsibility, and 
reporting declined. 
 
In contrast to the complex community dynamic around LF in Rochester, response rates were high in Seattle and 
Savannah primarily because of the aggressive approaches taken by employer RRO leaders. Boeing, the LF 
RRO leader in Seattle, met with representatives of community hospitals to convey its intention to adopt a new 
benefit design that would ―steer‖ employees to hospitals that did well in meeting LF leaps. Although some 
hospitals characterized this as ―heavy handed,‖ 100% of hospitals completed the LF survey in periods one and 
two and reporting remained high through period five. Seattle is the only RRO among the seven study sites 
where an employer actually incorporated financial incentives in its benefit design that rewarded employees for 
selecting hospitals that met LF standards (Scanlon, Lindrooth, & Christianson, 2007). However, in recent 
negotiations with its unions, Boeing reduced the number of employees exposed to these incentives. 
 
Savannah employers used a different, but equally aggressive, purchasing strategy that encouraged hospitals to 
report progress on the LF leaps. The RRO leader—the Savannah Business Group on Health (SBGH)—
purchases health care for about 20% of employees in Savannah. At the time the RRO was initiated, the SBGH 
utilized a structured contracting process that encouraged competition between the two local hospital systems, 
negotiating a contract with the winning system. Because it was willing to direct its business to a single hospital 
system, the SBGH had leverage in influencing hospitals to report their progress in meeting LF standards. Also, 
the contracting process had established a pattern of hospital performance reporting prior to the LF RRO. 
Although all Savannah hospitals responded to the initial LF survey, one hospital raised concerns about the 
legitimacy of other hospitals’ responses to survey questions and contacted LF’s national office. By period four, 
there was increased hospital resistance to reporting, even among hospitals contracting with SBGH. 
 
Intermediate Initial Response Rate Sites 
Three other study sites had initial survey response rates that did not reach 100% but still exceeded the average 
of the RRO sites not in our study. Wisconsin had an 83% response rate initially that grew to 88% by the third 
survey, even though the number of targeted hospitals increased during this period as the focus moved from 
the Madison area to the entire state. The Wisconsin RRO benefited from the leadership of the Employer Health 
Care Alliance Cooperative, an experienced employer coalition; a relatively sophisticated hospital community 
with respect to patient safety and public reporting; and a history of public reporting of hospital performance. As 
one respondent observed, ―the battles already had been fought‖ regarding quality measurement and public 
reporting prior to the RRO effort, and the LF hospital survey was relatively uncontroversial. Where hospital 
opposition existed, it tended to focus on technical issues regarding construction of some measures. 
 
Atlanta had a 73% hospital response rate for the first reporting period, declining to 44% by the fifth period. 
There are over 40 hospitals in Atlanta, although 20 are concentrated in four systems, with the largest system 
having a 15% market share. In Atlanta, the LF RRO leader attempted to take advantage of the competitive 
hospital market by striking ―. . . an agreement with the area’s largest hospital system, Promina, to implement 
LF’s three original patient safety practices by the end of 2004‖ (The Leapfrog Group, 2004; Weber, 2001). 
Promina supported LF’s agenda in the national press and publicly expressed its support for the RRO effort in 
Atlanta. While promising at first, this agreement lost its impact when Promina split into three separate entities. 
Also, from its inception, the Atlanta RRO faced problems in maintaining strong and consistent employer 
leadership and in recruiting employers to its cause. Initially, the Georgia Healthcare Leadership Council 
(GHLC) was the designated RRO leader, but two major Atlanta employers, Delta and UPS, felt that the RRO 
wasn’t receiving sufficient attention from the Council. The GHLC assumed responsibility for the RRO, 
although they lacked a staff or organizational structure to carry out RRO activities. Delta faced significant 
financial problems, while UPS employees were dispersed throughout the United States, even though Atlanta is 
its corporate headquarters. In sum, the beneficiaries from both companies generate a very small portion of 
hospitalizations in Atlanta. 
 
Aside from Promina, hospitals were not involved in a collaborative process around the RRO in Atlanta, and the 
Georgia Hospital Association criticized LF for failing to involve the Association in the RRO. Its Partnership for 
Health Accountability provided an alternative to the RRO for member hospitals with respect to patient safety 
and quality improvement efforts (Rask, Naylor, Schuessler, 2005). Despite these challenges, survey 
participation by Atlanta hospitals was relatively strong initially. Several major hospitals had committed to 
CPOE implementation prior to the LF RRO, and others were making use of intensivists, or intended to do so in 
the near future. For them, the LF survey was an opportunity to publicize these efforts. Tenet, a national for-
profit hospital company, was committed to LF at the national level and had nine owned or affiliated hospitals in 
Atlanta. As a matter of corporate policy, its hospitals completed the LF survey. Over time, however, reporting 
declined, shrinking to 44% by the fifth survey period, as the Atlanta RRO lost its leadership and momentum. 
Hospital respondents, in general, were skeptical that they would benefit from leap compliance through either 
increased volume or better payment rates. Some also questioned the scientific validity of the standards and saw 
the LF agenda as ―too ambitious.‖ 
 
In many ways, the interplay of factors that influenced hospital support for the LF RRO was the most complex in 
DFW. There are over 50 hospitals in DFW, and 73% are affiliated with four different systems, making DFW a 
relatively concentrated market. There is an experienced employer leader for LF—the DFW Business Group on 
Health (BGH)—which represents about 700,000 of the 5 million DFW residents. It has several ongoing 
programs, including a patient safety initiative, but no history of joint purchasing and only limited performance 
reporting. There is also a DFW hospital association, which initially organized hospital opposition to the RRO. 
This opposition was broken when the CEO of one of the largest hospital systems decided to endorse the LF 
efforts at a health care ―summit‖ convened by DFW employers. Subsequently, the CEOs of the hospital systems 
agreed to chair committees formed by the BGH to determine how the hospitals would address aspects of care 
related to the three leaps. The BGH chose this approach, rather than pushing for strict adherence to the leaps, 
because hospitals demanded that local standards be developed. This represented a deviation from the logic 
model illustrated in Figure 1. In the end, these groups could not achieve broad consensus on how to move 
forward, though hospital reporting has remained relatively stable in DFW. 
 
Low Initial Response Rate Site 
The lowest response rate in the first reporting period occurred in St. Louis, where there are four large hospital 
systems but relatively few locally based large corporations. The largest hospital system, with over 30% of the 
market, also is the largest employer in St. Louis. It publicly opposed the LF rollout and hospital reporting on 
the LF leaps, with the other hospitals following its lead. Consequently, only one hospital reported in the first 
period. By the fourth period, the response rate had increased to 20%, primarily because Tenet endorsed LF at 
the national level and required its hospitals in St. Louis to complete the survey. At the end of the fifth period, 
reporting had regressed to 12%. The RRO leader in St. Louis is an employer coalition with a relatively active 
purchasing history. However, its relationships with local hospitals, and particularly with the largest hospital 
system, sometimes have been contentious. At the time it became RRO leader, the coalition had an existing 
contract with a single health plan that was associated with a large hospital. This hospital was the sole responder 
in the first reporting period. Not only did the hospital have a prior connection with the RRO leader through a 
purchasing contract, but it also saw public reporting as a way to differentiate itself from its nonreporting 
competitors in St. Louis. Other hospitals in St. Louis doubted the ―staying power‖ of the LF RRO. One 
respondent noted that the employer group was often proposing new initiatives, replacing one with another. 
Thus, the inability of LF to engage hospitals in its RRO effort in St. Louis reflected a consolidated hospital 
market and aggressive opposition on the part of the dominant local hospital system; the absence of large, locally 
based employers in the non-health care sector of the economy; and a history of fractious employer-hospital 
relations that caused hospitals to be relatively pessimistic regarding the potential for RRO success. The lack of 
large employer involvement was particularly noteworthy given that Boeing, which led Seattle’s RRO, also had 
a large manufacturing presence in St. Louis. 
 
Summary: Hospital Survey Participation 
In our study sites, with the exception of St. Louis, the LF RRO efforts resulted in relatively high early response 
rates to the LF survey. Thus, the LF RROs accomplished an important short-term goal in the LF ―logic model.‖ 
Local market factors played varying roles in the decisions of hospitals to support RRO activities and respond to 
the LF survey. Organized and/or aggressive employers were important in Seattle and Savannah, while a history 
of collaborative work around health system reform and public reporting appears to have been significant in 
Rochester and Wisconsin. Opposition from the dominant hospital system in one market (St. Louis) was a key 
factor in explaining the low hospital response rate there. 
 
While market factors influenced hospitals’ reporting decisions in a variety of ways, there were other factors that 
exerted similar influences across study sites. First, in all communities, the reporting of performance information 
on the three leaps was not particularly difficult for hospitals to do. The efforts of LF at the national level to 
facilitate reporting online reduced the direct costs to hospitals of reporting. Second, irrespective of the 
communities in which they were located, hospitals did not expect that reporting would alter patient choices of 
hospitals in any direct way, given the other considerations that enter the hospital selection decision and, espe-
cially, the growing number of (nonleap) hospital metrics that were available to consumers. Third, hospitals in 
every community were skeptical that local employers, or their health plans, would use the information in the 
survey to reward employees, through benefit design, for using specific hospitals. In short, completing the LF 
survey and expressing public support for the LF RRO were low-cost, low-risk activities for most hospitals in 
every study site. While many saw little to gain from these efforts, they also felt that there was little risk 
involved. 
 
 
Results: Factors Influencing Hospital Progress in Achieving the LF Leaps 
In contrast to their widespread participation in the LF survey, hospitals in the study sites have shown much less 
progress than LF hoped for in accomplishing any of the leaps (see Table 3). In some cases, there has been 
regression from the first survey period to the fifth, though it is important to note that the regression from the 
first to second survey for coronary artery bypass surgery (CABG) and abdominal aortic aneurysm repair (AAA) 
is caused by a change in the way LF measured the standards. By and large, hospitals that met LF standards at 
the end of the study period were doing so prior to the first survey, while a few other hospitals progressed toward 
meeting LF standards. 
 
Based on our interviews, it appears that the lack of wide-scale improvement with respect to the leaps was 
caused in part by the nature of the leaps and the demands they placed on hospitals rather than specific 
community factors. Two of the three patient safety targets (leaps) chosen by LF proved very difficult, from a 
budget and a strategic perspective, for hospitals to address in a short time period. The installation of CPOE is 
potentially quite costly, and therefore hospitals typically consider it in the context of their long-term budgeting 
processes and in conjunction with other information system changes. Investment in CPOE competes with 
hospital investments in expansion of capacity, pursuit of joint ventures with physicians, and the purchase of 
other new technologies, all of which can have an immediate, positive impact on hospital revenues. At the time 
the first LF RROs began, hospitals questioned the cost and effectiveness of CPOE (Kuperman & Gibson, 2003), 
and many respondents believed that they already were pursuing less expensive, potentially more effective, 
methods of improving the safety of medication ordering and administration. 
 
Meeting the volume standards for surgery was even more problematic for many hospitals. Hospitals that fell 
100 to 200 procedures short of the CABG standard of 450 procedures annually, for example, faced the option of 
hiring or recruiting more surgeons to increase their volumes (with volume increases potentially coming at the 
expense of hospitals already meeting the standards, risking noncompliance with the standards on the part of 
these hospitals) or eliminating surgical capabilities and essentially any chance to re-establish them in the future. 
Some hospitals that were near the standard did adopt a growth strategy, but most dismissed the volume stan-
dards as impractical and naive. Instead, they questioned the evidence base for the volume standards and called 
on LF to measure risk-adjusted surgical outcomes, instead of volumes (Shahian, 2004). When LF responded by 
lowering the threshold for CABG and instituting outcomes standards where data were available, some hospital 
respondents saw this as evidence that LF was acknowledging the validity of their concerns. 
 
A second factor that helps explain the lack of hospital progress in achieving the LF leaps also is not unique to 
individual communities. Specifically, LF was one of many organizations pursuing quality improvement efforts, 
including efforts to reduce medical errors, during the study time period (Altman, Clancy, & Blendon, 2004; 
Devers, Pham, & Liu, 2004; Leape & Berwick, 2005). The existence of multiple national and state efforts was 
useful to LF in that it kept the national spotlight on its mission—the reduction of medical errors. However, it 
also meant that, in the words of one respondent, LF quickly became ―old news‖ to hospitals and employers; 
while it was initially viewed as ―innovative,‖ it came to be seen as less important than other national efforts. 
Some national hospital systems chose to support LF’s mission, encouraging their member hospitals to support 
local RRO efforts. However, at the community level, many hospitals chose to participate selectively in national 
and state quality improvement and patient safety efforts (e.g., the Institute for Health Improvement’s ―100,000 
Lives‖ initiative) where they had the best chance of performing well and were not required to report their 
performance publicly. In essence, the existence of multiple alternatives for hospitals at all study sites allowed 
hospitals to ―opt out‖ of LF, while still demonstrating to community leaders, employers, consumers, and their 
own employees a commitment to patient safety. 
 
A third factor that varied little across study communities was the skepticism of hospital administrators that local 
employer leaders of the LF RRO effort would create significant financial incentives or rewards for hospitals. 
(Galvin, Delbanco, Milstein, & Belden [2005] comment on this from a national perspective as well.) As a result 
of their experience with employer involvement in previous health reform efforts in their communities, hospitals 
had concluded that employers have ―short attention spans‖ when it comes to specific health care initiatives. 
Furthermore, many respondents noted that there were few large local employers capable of affecting them in a 
material way through benefit redesign, and that local employer coalitions would not be able to secure agreement 
among members to do joint purchasing based on LF performance. As a result, they saw few, if any, financial 
consequences for not demonstrating progress in meeting LF standards. 
 
Implications For Health Policy, Practice, and Reform 
Based on the expectations embedded in the logic model (Figure 1), LF’s RRO strategy can be viewed as 
successful in some dimensions and disappointing in others. In all but one of the study communities, the majority 
of hospitals reported their performance regarding the LF leaps, adding to the growing body of public 
information comparing hospital performance in general. Questions can, and have, been raised by hospitals about 
the choice of leaps and the specification of standards. However, LF’s efforts advanced the discussion of patient 
safety at the local level and provided interested employers with a ―place at the table‖ in that discussion. At the 
national level, LF has expanded its reporting efforts, as well as the number of hospitals targeted for reporting. 
The challenge now is for existing RRO leaders to maintain the commitment of local hospitals to reporting over 
time, and to move hospitals further to the right hand side of the logic model. In this regard, LF RRO leaders 
seemingly face a ―chicken and egg‖ problem. Hospitals are less likely to invest scarce resources in meeting LF 
standards, and in reporting their progress in that regard, when they do not see evidence that meeting these 
standards (or not meeting them) has financial consequences. Suzanne Delbanco, the chief executive of LF, has 
observed that ―. . . asking hospitals to report their progress publicly has probably spurred them to move more 
quickly. But . . . the safety practices the group is promoting publicly probably won’t catch on more widely until 
employers and insurers tie hospital payments to quality and safety—or provide financial incentives for patients 
to choose the safest hospital.‖ (“Hospitals make fewer errors,‖ 2004). However, employers are not likely to 
press very hard for ―tiered‖ benefit designs that encourage employees to use LF-compliant hospitals when there 
are too few hospitals meeting LF standards to make such a product viable. 
 
The lack of progress on the part of hospitals in the study sites in meeting the LF standards may not present a 
complete picture of the impact of RROs on local hospitals. A significant number of hospital respondents—
especially hospital medical directors and quality assurance officers—credited the LF RRO effort with 
increasing their leverage in negotiations over strategic and budget priorities within their organizations. It helped 
them push a patient safety agenda for their hospitals, even though that agenda ultimately may not have focused 
on meeting LF leap requirements. As a result, these respondents felt that the RRO effort had improved patient 
safety in their hospitals, albeit indirectly. 
 
While the LF RRO effort appears to have increased the availability to consumers of information on patient 
safety initiatives in local hospitals, elevated the discussion of ways to improve patient safety, and provided 
impetus for some hospitals to move more quickly in implementing patient safety initiatives, the lack of reported 
improvement on LF measures raises important questions (Galvin et al., 2005). Based on our interviews in the 
RRO communities, we believe that one question relates to the validity of the logic model that undergirds the 
RRO effort. The assumptions of this model may not adequately reflect the current balance of power in 
purchaser/provider relationships at the community level. The health services research literature suggests that 
this balance has shifted over the last decade (Bazzoli, Anneliese, & May, 2006; Capps & Dranove, 2004; 
Christianson & Trude, 2003; Devers et al., 2003; Mays, 2003; Nichols, Ginsburg, Berenson, Christianson, & 
Hurley, 2004). The employer ―value-based‖ purchasing model for health care (Christianson, 1997; Maxwell, 
Temin, & Watts, 2001; Meyer, 1996a, 1996b), as advocated by many benefits consultants and practiced by 
some large employers in the 1990s (Galvin & Delbanco, 2005), envisioned local markets in which employers 
worked with their health plan agents to secure concessions on cost and other contract features from hospitals. 
This vision implicitly assumed a hospital market in which multiple hospitals competed for patients, and where 
employers had substantial numbers of employees and dependents that they were willing to ―deliver‖ to one 
hospital or a subset of hospitals. While this situation still exists in some communities (e.g., in Savannah) most 
community health care systems have evolved in another direction. 
The new landscape of local health care systems has several features that are not supportive of the LF logic 
model. First, hospitals have consolidated into systems at the local level (Capps & Dranove, 2004; Cuellar & 
Gertler, 2003; Devers et al., 2003; Nichols et al., 2004) and are now more formidable negotiators with health 
plans. Their increased power derives not only from market consolidation, but also from a shift in the purchasing 
strategies of employers. Partly in response to ―managed care backlash‖ in the mid-1990s, employers have come 
to favor broad-network PPO plans that provide more choice of providers for their employees (Christianson & 
Trude, 2003; Robinson, 2004). Virtually all hospitals are now available to employees, as either in-network or 
out-of-network providers, irrespective of the health plan offered by employers (Robinson, 2004). In some 
communities, every hospital participates as an in-network provider in virtually every plan. Health plans try to 
create networks that include all of the hospital systems in a community because omitting a system, with its 
multiple hospitals, can leave a large hole in the network. However, this leaves them with limited leverage in 
their hospital negotiations. Today, these broad-network plans continue to dominate local health plan markets. 
New ―consumer-directed‖ benefit designs also utilize contracted networks of providers that are very inclusive. 
Even where employers have expressed interest in ―tiered network‖ products (which theoretically could place 
hospitals in different tiers to reflect hospital performance on LF leaps), health plans have been slow to offer 
them (Robinson, 2003; Mays, 2003). Plans are concerned that placing hospitals in tiers could jeopardize their 
contract negotiations with hospitals for the more popular preferred provider organization (PPO) products. At the 
local level, there are few employers large enough to justify health plans taking this risk. 
 
This suggests a second significant departure in local health care market characteristics from assumptions of the 
logic model; in the study sites, there were relatively few private-sector, non-health care employers with large 
numbers of employees concentrated in the RRO community. At the national level, LF was created by Fortune 
500 employers. These companies have large numbers of employees nationally and globally, and their actions 
command the attention of the national media. However, this does not mean that they have significant health care 
purchasing power at the RRO community level. In our study sites, the hospital systems themselves along with 
local and state governments and school systems typically had the largest number of locally based employees. 
Even when the RRO leader was a well-known national firm, its local employees represented a very small 
proportion of the potential demand for hospital services. Some employers were effective in securing attention 
and media coverage for local LF efforts, but did not have the capability of delivering significant numbers of 
patients to hospitals meeting LF standards. Employer coalitions in other communities had that potential, but did 
not have a history of joint purchasing. With respect to health care purchasing, the large employers in the study 
sites were under pressure to show immediate reductions in their health costs, which they were pursuing by 
redesigning benefits to shift more costs to employees. Benefit designs that favored LF compliant hospitals in 
tiered networks had the potential to deliver cost savings by reducing medical errors, but this was much less 
certain and not likely to address employers’ immediate needs to reduce health care spending. 
 
The findings of our analysis reinforce the findings of other recent studies of health system change at the 
community level. Our findings suggest a careful reassessment of expectations concerning the ability of private 
employers, through collective action, to play significant roles in changing the actual delivery of care in local 
health care systems. However, large employers can continue to exert significant influence on health care policy 
at the national level. In fact, their greatest strength may be in focusing public attention on the need to address 
flaws in the U.S. health care system, which LF did quite effectively. Employers also have an important role to 
play in spurring innovations in benefit designs and providing relevant information to support employee health 
care choices. 
 
Appendix 
Leapfrog (LF) Assessments of Hospital Progress in Meeting LF Leaps 
The LF survey provides information on hospital self-reported progress in meeting LF safety leaps. Beginning in 
the spring of each year, hospitals are given the opportunity to ―refresh‖ the information that they provided in the 
previous year. The survey results then are released monthly from July through March. Hospitals answer a series 
of questions regarding each leap, and LF converts their answers into summary measures of performance on the 
LF Web site. It was presumed in the LF logic model that the summary measures would be used by RRO 
employers in their communications with employees about comparative hospital performance. Hospitals that 
achieve a leap are designated by a completely shaded circle. A three-quarter circle indicates ―good progress,‖ 
while half a circle means ―good early stage effort‖ and a quarter circle is ―willing to report.‖ A blank circle 
indicates that a hospital was invited to report progress, but chose not to do so. Results also note where hospitals 
are not expected to respond. (For instance, a hospital would not respond to the survey questions about use of 
intensivists if it did not have an intensive care unit.) 
 
The exact criteria used to place a hospital in one category versus another vary with the leap, but the bar is set 
fairly low to be classified as ―good early stage effort.‖ For example, regarding use of intensivists, it simply 
indicates that the hospital commits to meeting the standard at some specified future date, and the hospital’s 
board has approved a budget sufficient to accomplish this goal. In this case, half the circle would be shaded, 
even though this hospital would, at the time the survey results were reported, presumably be no safer for 
patients than a hospital with an empty circle. In contrast, again using ―intensivists‖ as an example, ―good 
progress‖ (three quarters of the circle shaded) represents a considerable step beyond ―good early effort.‖ In a 
hospital with this designation, all patients in adult and pediatric intensive care units are managed by physicians 
certified in critical care medicine and the hospital meets some, but not all, of LF’s additional requirements 
regarding availability of an intensivist. 
 
Since the first reporting period, the leaps have been modified in response to concerns expressed by hospitals 
about the real-world barriers to achieving leaps, hospital skepticism about the connection between the leaps and 
patient safety improvement, and hospital advocacy for inclusion of other measures of patient safety. For 
instance, with respect to volume leaps, LF decided to accept outcome measures for some procedures when these 
data were collected and published by state governments. LF also dropped one volume-related measure, and it 
reduced the volume cut-off on another (coronary artery bypass surgery). A fourth leap, a composite indicator of 
the presence of practices believed to relate to quality of care, was introduced in 2004. In this study, for reasons 
of continuity and the ability to trend over an extended period of time, we focused on the first three leaps. 
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